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Behind the bombings
Who would be the main beneficiary?
June 13, 2005
iranian.com
The bombings
in Ahvaz and Tehran on Sunday June 12, 2005, only five days
before the elections, come as a surprise. The question is who is
behind these bombings? In my opinion, the most likely suspect is
some element within the regime itself. Why?
Precedent
There is a long history of elements within the regime itself
that have exploded bombs and engaged in killings while blaming
them on the Mojahedin Khalgh or other opposition groups. Those
precedents include the bombings in the shrine of Imam Reza in
Mashhad (which killed over two dozen innocent worshipers), the
killing of Mehdi Dibaj (a convert to Christianity), and possibly
the deaths of about 500 Iranians performing haj in Mecca in
1987.
The Usual Suspects?
One of the very few groups that has the capability and history
of bombings in Iran is the Mojahedin. They almost always claim
responsibility to prove their capabilities. The Mojahedin has
explicitly denied these bombings; therefore, it is safe to
assume that they did not commit these.
Motive
Who would be the main beneficiary of the bombings on Sunday thus
having a motive to do so?
Sunday, June 12, was a major day. Several main
events were occurring simultaneously. In front of Evin
prison, a sit-in was on its fourth day and growing. A hunger
strike had already begun by pro-democracy students in Tabriz, Yazd,
and Shahre Kord, and a hunger strike was scheduled to begin by
pro-democracy students and activists at the University of Tehran
on Sunday. Women’s rights advocates were holding
a rally protesting the discriminatory policies and
constitution of the regime.
All of this indicates the regime is confronted
by many simultaneous challenges, many of them growing as the
June 17th election day approaches. There are three main factions
among the ruling fundamentalist elites: hardliners (Khamanehi’s
faction), reformists (Khatami’s faction), and what I call
expedients (Rafsanjani’s faction). If the bombings were
committed by regime elements, then what motivation would each
faction have to bomb on June 12th?
Khatami
would not order the bombings because this would not increase the
likelihood to vote for Moin, the candidate Khatami supports.
That would leave Rafsanjani (or his supporters) and Qalibaf (or
his supporters) as the other two main suspects.
Various polls taken indicate that Rafsanjani,
Qalibaf, and Moin are the top three contenders for the election
(see polls conducted by Jahad
Daneshgahi and IRNA).
Moreover, the polls indicate none would get the required
majority of the votes cast necessary to win in the first round,
thus making a second round among the top two vote getters in the
run-off election (to be held in two weeks, if necessary).
The polls indicate that Rafsanjani is by far the
front runner, getting somewhere between 27% and 37% of the votes
of the respondents. Qalibaf and Moin are running neck and neck,
and Moin, (successfully gaining the support of Nehzat Azadi and
Melli Mazhabis) appears to be closing the gap. On the other
hand, Qalibaf has not succeeded in persuading other hardline
candidates (Larijani, Ahmadi-Nejad, and Rezaee) to withdraw from
the race.
A series of bombings would increase the
likelihood of votes going to Qalibaf as the self-proclaimed
“Hezbollahi Reza Khan,” promising to restore order by
massive repression. Therefore, because Qalibaf is the main
beneficiary of the bombings on Sunday, one may suspect that he
or his supporters may have been behind them.
It does not seem likely that Rafsanjani, the
consummate wily shark, is responsible for this series of
bombings. Although Rafsanjani has been behind many, if not all,
of the terrorist actions by the regime in the past 26 years, the
June 12 bombings do not benefit him personally at this juncture.
At this juncture Rafsanjani seems assured to be one of the two
candidates in the run off.
If Qalibaf is Rafsanjani’s opponent in the
second round, most Moin voters would vote for Rafsanjani in
order to keep Qalibaf out, assuring a Rafsanjani victory. And if
Moin is Rafsanjani’s second round opponent, then Qalibaf and
other hardline voters would vote for Rafsanjani to keep Moin
out. Thus, Rafsanjani would not benefit from any bombing at THIS
juncture.
Conclusion
Although logic indicates that Qalibaf or his supporters may be
behind the June 12 bombings, this is mere speculation. It
appears, however, that they are the only ones that have the
capability, history, and motive to do so. Nevertheless, much
that occurs in Iran is not rational. Only the future will show
who exactly is behind these bombings.
Even if the regime was to apprehend the actual
culprits and they were not declared “rouge elements of the
Ministry of Intelligence,” Iranians, by and large, would not
accept regime’s explanation. The problem for the
fundamentalist regime is that it lacks credibility among the
population due to a long history of deception. Like the boy who
cried wolf [choopan-e doroogh-goo], the people simply do not
believe the word of this regime.
About
Masoud Kazemzadeh is Associate Professor in the Department
of Political Science at Sam Houston State University in
Huntsville, Texas. He is the author of Islamic
Fundamentalism, Feminism, and Gender Inequality in Iran Under
Khomeini (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
2002), and The Bush Doctrine and Iran: Alternative
Scenarios and Consequences (forthcoming).
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